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Why Didn't the Supreme Court Take My
Advice in the Heller Case?
Some Speculative Responses to an
Egocentric Question
SANFORD LEVINSON*

INTRODUCTION

I am extremely grateful to the editors of the Hastings Law Journal
for giving me the opportunity to lead off what turned out to be a superb
Symposium on District of Columbia v. Heller,' the (in)famous case in
which a slender majority of the Supreme Court invalidated a District of
Columbia ordinance that functionally prohibited the private possession
of handguns even in one's own home. As readers of the entire
Symposium will readily see, a number of participants presented
excellent, even stunning, legal analyses of the issues raised by Heller, and
it is no purpose of mine to try to compete with those papers even if I had
the capacity to do so. Instead, I want in many ways to forego legal
analysis entirely and build on my alternate identity as a political scientist
to offer some admittedly highly speculative conclusions regarding a
variety of institutional issues presented by the litigation of Heller within
the Supreme Court. One will readily note the relative absence of
footnotes in what follows. This is explained not only by the informality of
the original remarks that I offered to "keynote" the Symposium, but
also, and more importantly, by the sheer fact that I will be offering a
variety of surmises that, though potentially capable of proof or disproof,
can certainly not be easily substantiated at this time through any material
in the public record. I obviously believe in the plausibility of everything I

* W. St. John Garwood and W. St. John Garwood Jr. Centennial Chair in Law, University of

Texas Law School; Professor of Government, University of Texas at Austin. These comments were
originally prepared for a "keynote" talk at the excellent Symposium on Heller organized by the editors
of the Hastings Law Journal on February 13, 2009. I am extremely grateful to the editors, and to
Professor Calvin Massey, for their kindness in inviting me and providing such outstanding hospitality
at the event itself. I have retained the informal format of the remarks. I am also grateful to Mark
Graber for his responses to an earlier draft.
I. 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
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will be asserting, but the kinds of proof that lawyers-and even more to
the point, law review editors -prefer, will be lacking.
I begin by noting that on February 25, 2008, I published a piece in
the National Law Journaf entreating the members of the Supreme Court
to accept the guidance of the brief filed in the Heller case by thenSolicitor General Paul Clement for the United States as amicus curiae
Without going through Clement's entire argument, I think it is fair to
summarize it as follows:
" The Second Amendment indeed does offer some level of
protection for the ownership and possession of firearms.
* However, the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia had, in
its own decision in the case, placed too strict a burden on the
government in order to justify the regulation of firearms.
" The Court, after enunciating the correct test, should remand the
case to the Circuit Court below for a decision applying the
correct standard of review, which might well have led to the
repeated invalidation of the District of Columbia law at issue in
the case.
Although I did not agree with the Clement brief in every detail-it
was more "originalist" than is my own wont-it struck me as a
thoroughly commendable piece of lawyering, carefully analyzing the
various issues raised by the litigation and expressing great concern for
the various institutional interests at stake. I have never met the former
Solicitor General, but it reinforced what I had heard from more
knowledgeable friends that he was a thoroughly professional, relatively
non-ideological, member of the Bush Administration.
As someone with a longtime interest in the Second Amendment,' I
was obviously interested in what the Court might and should say in its
first full-scale confrontation with the Amendment in almost seventy
years The Clement brief struck me as providing excellent guidance for
the Court. Frankly, its attractiveness transcended what might be called
"merely legal" considerations. Acceptance of its views by the Court,
including those Justices out of phase with the current majority, might
help to soften the culture war about guns that has been a feature of
American life now for many years. 6 Moreover, it would be disingenuous
2. Sanford Levinson, Why Use Originalism?,NAT'L L.J., Feb. 25, 2008, at 27.
3. Brief for the United States as Anicus Curiae, Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (No. o7-290), 2008 AL
157201.

4. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, The EmbarrassingSecond Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637 (1989).
5. See Miller v. United States, 307 U.S. 174 (1939)-

6. See, e.g., MARK V. TUSHNET, OUT OF RANGE: WHY THE CONSTITUTION CAN'T END THE BATTLE
OVER GUNS (20O7) (providing a good overview of the cultural, political, and legal cleavages
surrounding the issue of gun control); see also GUNS IN AMERICA: A READER (Jan E. Dizard et al. eds.,
1999) (collection of essays on various aspects of the topic).
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to suppress the fact that I have also long believed that the Democratic
Party has unwisely "overinvested" in supporting basically symbolic "gun
control" measures, with dire consequences for the Party's appeal to
important parts of the electorate.7 Dampening the culture war would be
good not only for the country; it would also help the Democratic Party
(not, one can be certain, a goal of the Solicitor General's).
My esteem for the brief, which represented the purported views of
the Bush Administration, was not shared by everyone in that
Administration. Thus, former Vice President Dick Cheney, in his
capacity as President of the Senate, signed a competing brief that was
considerably more favorably disposed to the D.C. Circuit Court's
opinion.8 It is worth noting that that brief was submitted on behalf of "55
Members of the United States Senate, the President of the United States
Senate, and 250 Members of the United States House of
Representatives," i.e., a majority of both the House and the Senate.9 An
obvious question, especially for political scientists, is what explains the
striking cleavage between the Office of the Solicitor General and the
Office of the Vice President (or President of the Senate). I strongly
suspect that the answer lies in Clement's having to behave as a more
truly institutionally "responsible" decision maker than was true of the
senators, representatives, and Vice President, who had greater freedom
to engage in rather flamboyant position-taking, for their own political
ends, than did Clement.
Thus, I would expect evidence to be available, even if I do not
currently possess it, that Clement, as Solicitor General, believed that he
had an institutional, even if not formally "legal," duty to be responsive to
the career attorneys in the Department of Justice, particularly those in
the Criminal Division, who were legitimately concerned that the opinion
written by Judge Laurence Silberman for the D.C. Circuit Court would,
if accepted without significant modification, call into question a whole
panoply of federal regulations going well beyond the de facto prohibition
of handguns instantiated in the District of Columbia ordinance."0
Another way of putting this, perhaps, is that the Department of Justice,
embodied for these purposes in the Solicitor General, no longer had the
luxury of offering its rather vague, general support for the Second

7. See Sanford Levinson, DemocraticPolitics and Gun Control, RECONSTRUCTION, Spring

1992, at

'37, 137-41.
8. Brief for Amici Curiae 55 Members of United States Senate et al. in Support of Respondent,
Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (No. o7-29o), available at http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs/
o7-o8/o7-29oRespondentAmCuSenateHouseMembers.pdf.
9. Id.
Io. See REBECCA MAE SALOKAR, THE SOLIcrrOR GENERAL: THE POLmCS OF LAW 77-86 (1992)
(discussing the Solicitor General's responsiveness to divisions, departments, and agencies within the
executive branch).
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Amendment, as had been announced by former Attorney General John
Ashcroft." Rather, it had to walk a careful course between recognizing
the legitimate rights of gun owners while, at the same time, recognizing
the equally legitimate interests of the public in a broad range of
regulations. To adopt the language of my colleague Mitchell Berman, it
was not enough to say that the Constitution "meant" that "gun rights"
were protected; instead, courts now had to craft "constitutional decision
rules" that gave genuine and implementable meaning to the far more
general declaration of constitutional protection. 2
In any event, as it is sometimes said, "what one sees depends on
where one sits," and Clement sat in a chair that required a significant
measure of institutional responsibility for the consequences of legal
positions that were being asserted. That, of course, may not describe the
situation of the many members of Congress who are almost infinitely
more concerned with keeping their political "bases" happy-and thus
assuring their reelection-than with the institutional interests of oftdismissed "bureaucrats" who staff such institutions as the Criminal
Division of the Justice Department. This is true, whether paradoxically
or not, even if one might readily suspect that these particular bureaucrats
are relatively unlikely to be politically "liberal" in the way that term is
commonly used. Indeed, one would assume that most people who choose
to be career prosecutors feel especially concerned with putting
presumptively bad people behind bars and believe that federal laws
prohibiting, say, felons from possessing firearms, are a handy means to
that desirable end.
Moreover, for what it is worth, there is good reason to believe that
the Clement brief captures the present views of the American public.
Contemporary public opinion polling data demonstrates, fairly
conclusively, that most Americans do believe in some kind of individual
right to possess firearms, 3 even as the same data show that most
Americans support greater control of handguns.'4 But "control," for most
people, does not mean the de facto "prohibition" present in the D.C.
ordinance, which helps to explain what appears to be wide support for
the Court's ultimate decision. 5 I would doubt, though, that Clement was
ii. Letter from John Ashcroft, U.S. Attorney Gen., to James Jay Baker, Executive Dir., Nat'l
Rifle Ass'n (May 17, 200), available at http://www.nraila.org/images/Ashcroft.pdf.
12. Mitchell N. Berman, ConstitutionalDecision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. I, 9-12 (2004).
13. See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, Do You Have a Legal Right to Own a Gun?, USA TODAY, Feb. 27,
20o8, at IA, available at http://www.usatoday.comlnews/washington/2oo8-o2-26-guns-coverN.htm
("Nearly three out of four Americans-73% -believe the Second Amendment spells out an individual
right to own a firearm, according to a USA TODAY/Gallup Poll of i,oi6 adults taken Feb. 8-io.").
14. See, e.g., Harris Poll, Does the Second Amendment Provide the Right to Bear Arms? U.S.
Adults Think So, HARRIS INTERACrIVE, June 3, 2oo8, http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris-poll/
index.asp?PID=914.
15. Although there does not appear to be a Gallup or other poll on Heller per se, one reason to
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particularly motivated by appealing to "the American public," as against
maintaining the loyalty of career professionals within the Justice
Department (or, for that matter, the Justices of the Supreme Court who
look to the Solicitor General for conscientious reflection).
In my National Law Journal article, I expressed the hope, naYve as
this appears in retroslrect, that the Court might even join together in a
unanimous decision.' This would necessarily require that the four
"moderates" or "liberals"-what one calls them is a function of one's
own politics -concede that the Second Amendment does indeed offer at
least some meaningful protection to peaceful and law-abiding citizens
who wish to possess guns, especially in their own homes. 7 This would
entail rejection of what is usually called the "collective rights" view of the
Amendment inasmuch as that is interpreted as protecting only the right
of states to have organized militias should they wish to and otherwise
leaves individual citizens at the mercy of unfettered legislative power. 's
"Conservatives" on the Court would obviously have to accept a less
rigorous view of the Amendment than that enunciated by the Circuit
Court below, but one might have hoped that Chief Justice John Roberts
especially, given his announced desire to achieve a more harmonious
Court,'9 might acquiesce to such a deal if it enabled the writing of a
unanimous-or even a near-unanimous -opinion. Moreover, as already
noted, the achievement of such unanimity-the Scalian lion sitting in
peaceful repose with the Ginsburgian lamb-might conceivably help to
cool down the "culture war" that rages over the issue of guns; political
liberals and conservatives could demonstrate the possibility of achieving
a meaningful compromise that offered a way out of the current
unpleasantness of acrimony and mistrust. Former President George W.
Bush's hope expressed during the 2000 campaign to be a "uniter, not a
divider"' would be achieved, thanks to his Solicitor General, in a
perhaps unexpected area of American politics.2'
suspect wide support for the decision is that almost no prominent national politician even criticized
Heller, let alone denounced it. This included, of course, then-candidate Barack Obama, who issued a
statement after the Supreme Court's decision, noting his belief "that the Second Amendment protects
the right of individuals to bear arms." See Posting of Christopher Hass to Organizing for America
Community Blogs, http://my.barackobama.com/page/community/post/stateupdates/gG5NxL (June 26,
2008, 12:25 pm EDT). I take this to be a signal that those politicians with special incentives to discern
public opinion believe that the Court's enunciation of such a right is widely supported.
16. Levinson, supra note 2.
17. Id.

i8. Id.
i9. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, Roberts's Rules, ATLAN IC MONTHLY, Jan.-Feb. 2007, at 104-05,
availableat http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/2oo7o/john-roberts.
2o. George W. Bush, Why You Should Vote for Me, USA TODAY, Nov. 7,2000, at 29A.
21. My friend Mark Graber offers the cautionary note that there is no real evidence that Supreme

Court decisions, even if they are unanimous, can actually play an effective role in what might be
termed "managing" important conflicts within American culture. E-mail from Mark A. Graber,
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Needless to say, my hopes were (almost) completely unfulfilled.
Heller, as most recognize, is just another example of a bitter 5-4 split in
the Court in which each side leveled broadsides at the other that, in
effect, challenged their intellectual competence as constitutional
interpreters. The tone of Justice Antonin Scalia's opinion is that of a lion
seeking to devour his adversaries rather than to live with them in a spirit
of amity. What is especially ironic-and thus explains my parenthetical
"almost" in the first sentence of this paragraph-is that a careful reading
of Justice Scalia's opinion in the case, whatever its tone, suggests that the
actual import of Heller may be far, far closer to what would have been
the case had the Clement brief forthrightly been accepted. A number of
commentators, including participants in the Hastings Symposium, have
already suggested that Heller is a relatively unloaded weapon with regard
to almost all state and federal gun control legislation beyond the
prohibition of firearms in one's home.2
So my question, however egocentric it sounds, is "why didn't the
Court follow my altogether sensible advice?" Especially since that would
have required only the acceptance of the formal position of the Bush
Administration itself and foregoing the Supreme Court's own
invalidation of the D.C. ordinance (rather than remanding it to the court
below for that almost certain fate)? Even in the absence of direct
evidence, I believe that I can, as both a lawyer and political scientist,
offer some surmises that might prove illuminating in our attempts to
analyze judicial decisions and the judges who make them.
I. WAS IT SIMPLY DUMB TO BELIEVE THAT LIBERALS/MODERATES
MIGHT BE ATIRACTED BY CLEMENT'S ARGUMENT

(OR BY ANY OTHER ARGUMENT THAT WOULD LEAD TO THE

D.C. ORDINANCE)?
The answer to this nonrhetorical question might, of course, be yes.
But there are three separate grounds by which one might achieve that
conclusion. The first is to deny that Clement (or anyone else attacking
the ordinance) presented a correct reading of the Constitution, so no
INVALIDATION OF THE

Professor of Law and Gov't, Univ. of Md. Sch. of Law, to author (Feb. 24, 2009, 09:36 CST) (on file
with the Hastings Law Journal). Consider only the unanimous opinion in Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 0954), which notably failed to bring closure to the debate over school
segregation. And, Graber writes, "[c]ertainly Marbury and McCulloch do not support the proposition"
that unanimity stills dissent in the wider culture. Graber, supra.
22. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Gun Ruling Was Called a Landmark, but That Remains To Be Seen,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2oo9, at A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2o09/o3/17/us/
I7bar.html?ref=politics ("Since [Heller], lower federal courts have decided more than 8o cases
interpreting the decision... and it is now possible to make a preliminary assessment of its impact. So
far, Heller is firing blanks."); see also Symposium, The Second Amendment After Heller, 60 HASnNGS
L.J. 1203 (2009); Adam Winkler, Heller's Catch-22, 56 UCLA L. REv. 1551 (2009) (detailing Heller's
lack of significance for courts below).
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more need be said. Judges should be guided, as avatars of Ronald
Dworkin's "Hercules," by their view as to the best view of the law. 3
Even if I happen to believe that Clement's brief, perhaps suitably
tweaked, presented just that view, that is truly irrelevant in the absence
of sincere agreement by the judges in question. This premise obviously
relies on what is in fact a controversial analysis of judicial decision
making, which both takes legal argument with the utmost seriousness
and presumes that judges are guided by such argument rather than, say,
their own policy preferences. However, many people, especially in the
legal academy, have this view. If one asks why the majority and
dissenters disagree so dramatically on the reading of the Constitution, all
one can say is that they happen to have sincerely different views about
constitutional meaning. To be sure, that difference might well embarrass
anyone who believes that high-quality legal education-six of the nine
Justices went to the Harvard Law School, after al124-should produce
some kind of consensus as to how tough legal questions should be
answered, but that is the topic for another essay.
For many, especially political scientists, the best explanation for the
kind of differences observed in Heller (and, of course, many other cases)
is that legal arguments per se are relatively weak explanations for judicial
votes. Given that almost all cases that reach the Supreme Court involve
quite indeterminate aspects of the Constitution, judges make their
decisions not on the basis of "convincing legal arguments"-the
existence of which is belied by the very splits we are trying to explain but, rather by the policy preferences of the judges. To hope that the four
ultimate dissenters would find my views compatible would have required
believing, albeit implausibly, that they in fact personally support at least
some degree of freedom for persons to own handguns in the District of
Columbia and thus agree that the ordinance is an indefensible
infringement of what is properly viewed as a constitutionally protected
liberty. Indeed, perhaps one would have to imagine that one or more of
those judges might want to have a handgun in his or her own home as a
potential means of defense against an intruder. Such an analysis relies on
adopting what is usually called the "attitudinal model" of judging, which
emphasizes the role of judges, particularly at the level of the Supreme
Court, as public-policy makers rather than impersonal servants of
inevitably indeterminate legal commands. 5
See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY I 16-i8 (977).
24. If Supreme Court nominee (and Yale Law School graduate) Sonia Sotomayor is confirmed,
Harvard's representation on the Court will be down to a "mere" five.
23.

25. See, e.g.,

JEFFREY

A.

SEGAL & HAROLD

J.

SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATITUDINAL

86-97 (2002) (delineating the argument that Justices' policy attitudes are the
primary variable in explaining their decision); see also Frank B. Cross, Chief Justice Roberts and
Precedent: A Preliminary Study, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1251, 1258-66 (2o08) (providing an excellent
MODEL REVISITED
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If there is anything that seems clear beyond doubt, though, it is that
the four Justices in dissent are exceedingly unlikely to have a policy
preference for "gun rights" instead of "gun control" (or, indeed, "gun
prohibition"). To the extent that class and culture seem to be linked with
one's position on the issue of guns,26 it is hard to find a more predictable
set of "anti-gun" decision makers than at least three of the four
dissenters. The fourth, Justice David Souter, is, after all, from New
Hampshire-the "live free or die" state-and if one knew nothing more
about Souter than his identity as a Granite State Republican, one might
be surprised if he shared the animus against guns that I am attributing
(without specific evidence) to Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen
Breyer, and John Paul Stevens. Attitudinalism triumphs, but in the
opposite direction from my own desire for acceptance of the Clement
brief. Of course, it should be noted immediately, there is no reason to
adopt an attitudinal model to explain the dissenters and not the Justices
in the majority. Perhaps the Justices in the majority are as predisposed,
on policy grounds, to favor greater gun rights as the Justices in the
minority are to be perturbed by that very possibility.
Recall that I offered two other reasons to embrace the Solicitor
General's argument. One involved dampening the culture war. Why
should not all Justices, whether liberal or conservative, believe that that
might be conducive to the institutional interests of the Court itself,
especially if it gained widespread applause from the broad center of the
American public for reaching such a sensible "middle ground"? And
would not it have been obvious to the dissenting Justices that there
would be a vast public outcry-not only from conservative
Republicans -should the Court overrule the Circuit Court and reinstate
the prohibitory D.C. gun ban? My second reason, under some models,
might be thought to be relevant, at least to the two identified Democrats
on the Court, Justices Breyer and Ginsburg. The perceived militant
opposition to the rights of gun owners by the Democratic Party over the
past several decades has been bad for its political health. There is, for
example, strong evidence that President Bill Clinton's insistence on
forcing the "assault-weapons" ban through Congress as part of his 1994
legislative package helped to contribute to the debacles in the 1994
elections-including the loss of Speaker of the House Tom Foley (from a
hunting-oriented district in eastern Washington) -that shifted control of
comparison of "legalist" and "attitudinal" models of explaining judicial behavior); Howard Gillman,
What's Law Got to Do with It? Judicial Behavioralists Test the "Legal Model" of Judicial Decision
Making, 26 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 465 (2001) (providing an illuminating and readily accessible entry

point into the debate).
26. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan et al., Modeling Facts, Culture and Cognition in the Gun Debate, 18
Soc. JusT. Ras. 203 (2005); Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, More Statistics, Less Persuasion:A
CulturalTheory of Gun-Risk Perceptions, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 1291, 1292-1305 (2003).
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the House from Democrats to the Republicans with stunning
consequences for American politics (including Clinton's own subsequent
impeachment). 7
Whatever might have motivated the refusal of the dissenters to
bend, it was not a concern for the institutional interests of the
Democratic Party. Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton both spent much
of the spring of 2008 declaring, with whatever degree of sincerity, their
respect for guns in general and the Second Amendment in particular. 8 I
am confident that the Obama campaign would have treated a "victory"
by the dissenters as akin to the discovery of new tapes of speeches by the
Reverend Jeremiah Wright, perhaps showing the candidate clapping at
the more incendiary passages of Reverend Wright. This is no small point:
one is sometimes tempted to view our division of judges into
"conservative" or "liberal" as equal to a commitment to the interests of
the political parties identified with such views. Thus a "conservative
judge" will rule in ways that foreseeably help the Republican Party, just
as a "liberal judge" would be expected to ask, prior to casting his or her
vote, what is good for the Democrats. To be sure, there are cases, such as
Bush v. Gore,29 that certainly invite (and, I believe, justify) such a
perspective. But we should be clear that many, many cases do not.
Racial gerrymandering, for example, is an unusually interesting
example of a situation where ideology and political interest almost
certainly do not converge. That is, it has been, generally speaking,
Republicans who have benefited overall from the significant use of racial
criteria in designing electoral districts, and Democrats, concomitantly,
who have paid significant costs. 3 This, however, is not reflected in the
split within the Supreme Court, where sincere conservatives, who are
appalled by racial gerrymandering, have attempted to shut it down, even
as political liberals have been willing to support it regardless of the costs
it might impose on the Democratic Party.3 Political ideology might
27. See HARRY L. WILSON, GUNS, GUN CONTROL, AND ELECTIONS: THE POLITICS AND POLICY OF
FIREARMS 156-62 (2006).

28. See, e.g., Gun-Shy Candidates Fall Short of a Solution, ABC NEWS, Feb. i7, 2008, http:/I
www.abcnews.go.com/Politics/story?id=43o3968 (detailing Obama's and Clinton's support for the
Second Amendment and an individual right to bear arms).
29. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
30.

See, e.g.,

MINORITY

DAVID LUBLIN, THE PARADOX OF REPRESENTATION:

INTERESTS IN CONGRESS

IO (1997)
politicians,

RACIAL GERRYMANDERING AND

(arguing that conservative Republicans, along with
have been the principal beneficiaries of racial

African-American and Latino
gerrymandering).
31. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 9oo (1995); Shaw v.
Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993). Each of the cases in this string of 5-4 decisions involving racial
gerrymandering featured a lineup of five political conservatives, all Republican, in the majority against
two Democrats and two distinctly moderate Republicans. Indeed, the most recent voting rights case,
Bartlett v. Strickland, decided by the Supreme Court on March 9, 2009, is another "standard-form" 5-4
split, with Justice Kennedy writing for the conservative majority. See 129 S. Ct. 1231, 1235-38 (2009).
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explain these different voting patterns, but a crass commitment to the
short-run interest of the political party that presumably instantiates the
general ideology does not. This is why it was a group of politically
conservative Justices who made an immense in-kind contribution to the
Obama campaign by, in effect, taking the issue of gun control and gun
rights off the table for the 2008 election season and providing candidate
Obama with the opportunity to offer his support to the Heller decision as
a way of reassuring gun owners that he in fact supported the Second
Amendment and its guarantee of at least some sort of protection for the
right to bear arms.
II.

WHAT ABOUT THE MAJORITY?

The fact that there might be good explanations for the refusal of the
dissenters to go along with my eminently sensible recommendations does
not provide answers to the linked question of why the majority also
chose not to embrace the Clement brief. Perhaps that was never in the
cards. But perhaps it also depended, in large measure, on who was
chosen to write the majority opinion.
A.

WHY SCALIA?

Having disposed of the dissenting minority and offered some
surmises as to why none of them, one presumes, made any overtures to
Chief Justice Roberts and his conservative colleague to coalesce around
a Clement-type opinion, we are left with the task of explaining some of
the oddities in the behavior of the Justices in the majority. Begin with the
very point that there were multiple ways to get to the desired result,
including adopting the Clement brief.
So the first question one should ask is why Chief Justice Roberts
assigned the opinion to Justice Scalia? The operating rule of the Court is
that the Chief Justice, if part of the majority, gets to assign the task of
writing the opinion to whomever he wishes." Otherwise, the senior
Justice selects the opinion writer.33 So why did he wish that Justice
Scalia- certainly one of the most polarizing figures on the Court-write
what would undoubtedly be viewed as one of the major opinions of the
entire term, if not of many terms? Is it enough to say that Scalia was
almost certainly champing at the bit, having in effect announced several
years before that he was ready and willing to breathe life in what had
become the moribund Second Amendment?' But Justice Thomas had
32. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE UNITED STATES 294-95 (David S. Tanenhaus ed., 2008); THE
OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 607 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds.,

1992).
33. See supra note 32.

34. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATrER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 43, 136-37
(1998).
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also indicated what might be called a proprietary interest in the Second
Amendment." So why not choose Justice Thomas, who has rarely had
the opportunity to write a truly major opinion for the Court? Moreover,
Justice Thomas is a far more committed "originalist" than is Justice
Scalia, a self-proclaimed "faint-hearted originalist." 6 This, of course, may
help to explain the choice of Justice Scalia over Justice Thomas, at least
if we assume that Chief Justice Roberts, if an originalist at all, is almost
infinitely more likely to be of the faint-hearted, rather than full-throated,
variety.
But this simply forces us to ask why Chief Justice Roberts chose
Justice Scalia-or an originalist-at all? Why did he not assign it to
himself, given the obvious importance of the decision? There is at least a
limited tradition of Chief Justices assigning themselves the opinions in
cases that are viewed as unusually significant for the polity. Chief Justice
John Marshall, most notably, made a career out of doing so. 7 The most
famous modern example, of course, is the then-newly appointed Chief
Justice Earl Warren's taking the helm in Brown v. Board of Education."
Or think of Chief Justice Warren Burger's opinion in United States v.
Nixon.39 It has been suggested, though, that "Chief Justice Rehnquist did
not display this tendency to self-assign important opinions, ' and itis
possible that Roberts, who, after all, clerked for Rehnquist, was
influenced by this relatively self-effacing behavior.
In choosing Justice Scalia, Chief Justice Roberts was also choosing in
effect to receive an opinion that would undoubtedly push Justice Scalia's
own favored approach to constitutional interpretation, which is, at least
rhetorically, "originalist." As former Harvard Law School Professor Cass
Sunstein wrote at the very beginning of his recent Harvard Law Review
article analyzing Justice Scalia's opinion, it is, without doubt, "the most
explicitly and self-consciously originalist opinion in the history of the
Supreme Court."4 ' Surely, this could have been no surprise to Chief
35. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 936-39 (1997) (Thomas, J., concurring) (explicitly
recognizing, unlike Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court, the potential significance of the Second
Amendment).
36. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism:The Lesser Evil, 57 U. GIN. L. REV. 849, 864 (1989) ("I hasten
to confess that in a crunch I may prove a faint-hearted originalist."); see also Randy E. Barnett,
Scalia's Infidelity: A Critique of "Faint-Hearted"Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 7, 8-16 (20o6). For an
example of Justice Thomas's comparatively greater commitment to originalism, see his concurring
opinion in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,584-602 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
37. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(i Cranch) 137 (18o3).
38. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
39. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
40. See Cross, supra note 25, at 1267 n.iI8 (citing Forest Maltzman & Paul J. Wahlbeck, May It
Please the Chief? Opinion Assignments in the Rehnquist Court,4o AM. J. POL. SO. 421, 435 (1996)).
41. Cass R. Sunstein, Second Amendment Minimalism: Heller as Griswold, 122 HARv. L. REV.
246, 246 (2OO8).
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Justice Roberts. So, regardless of the demeanor he adopted before the
Senate Judiciary Committee, to which he pledged that his jurisprudence
would be distinguished by its "modesty and humility," -which seemed to
suggest a respect for precedent and deference to other decision-making
bodies-perhaps Chief Justice Roberts is actually a hard-core originalist
who happily sees an ally in the predictably dogmatic, flamboyant, and
decidedly nondeferential Justice Scalia. 2
B.

BUT

How

AUTONOMOUS WAS SCALIA AFTER ALL? WHAT WAS THE

PRICE OF GETTING A FIFTH VOTE?

The Chief Justice had complete autonomy in deciding whom to ask
to write the presumptive "Opinion of the Court," but, of course, he could
not necessarily guarantee that all of his four colleagues in the majority
would be happy with what would be presented to them. Indeed, it
appears close to self-evident that Justice Scalia made some significant
concessions in order to get at least the key fifth vote, presumably from
Justice Anthony Kennedy, but, who exactly knows, maybe from Chief
Justice Roberts and/or Justice Samuel Alito as well. What unites almost
everyone who has attempted to analyze Justice Scalia's opinion is a
shared belief that it is an intellectual shambles, particularly, and
centrally, with regard to the notorious Part II4" in which he announces,
without the slightest trace of supporting argument, that most federal gun
control laws are in fact constitutionally unproblematic, whatever might
have been suggested by the language earlier in the opinion.'
"Originalism" goes out the window at this point, which may help to
explain why perhaps the most savage critique of Justice Scalia's opinion
has been written by Professor Nelson Lund, a strong conservative
supporter of gun rights who is also originalist in his preferred
methodology of constitutional analysis.45 "[T]he Court's reasoning,"
writes Professor Lund, "is at critical points so defective-and so
transparently non-originalist in some respects-that Heller should be

42. See Jeffrey Toobin, No More Mr. Nice Guy, NEW YORKER, May 25, 2009, at 43, availableat
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/05/25/o9o525fa facttoobin.
43. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2816-17 (2008).
44. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as PopularConstitutionalismin Heller,
122 HARV. L. REV. 191, 196-97 (2008) (referring to the "temporal oddities in the evidence the majority
marshals").
45. Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Heller, and OriginalistJurisprudence, 56 UCLA L.
Rev. 1343 (2009). Interestingly enough, Scalia's opinion has also been strongly criticized by at least two
conservative federal judges who believe that it betrayed another conservative value, judicial restraint.
See Richard A. Posner, In Defense of Looseness: The Supreme Court and Gun Control, NEW REPUBLIC,
Aug. 27, 2008, at 32, available at http://www.tnr.com/story-print.html?id=d2f38db8-3c8a-477e-bdoa5bd56deoe7co; J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the UnravelingRule of Law, 95 VA. L.
REV. 253 (2009).
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seen as an embarrassment for those who joined the majority
''6
opinion.... Originalism deserved better from its judicial defenders. ,
Part III begins by noting that, unexceptionably, "[l]ike most rights,
the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited," and
Justice Scalia goes on to recognize a plethora of those limits.47 He
specifically mentions, for example, such common laws as those
prohibiting possession of firearms by convicted felons or by the mentally
ill.4" Similarly, Justice Scalia is quick to assert the legitimacy of regulating
firearms outside the home or prohibiting "unusual" firearms, 9 though, as
already suggested, there is no scintilla of an explanation as to why, say,
Martha Stewart, a decidedly nonviolent convicted felon, no longer has
what we were earlier told was a constitutionally protected right to be
able most effectively to defend herself in the sanctuary of her own
home." "Originalists" certainly could note, altogether accurately, that
many contemporary limits on firearms are relatively recent-or at least
far past 1791-additions to the federal code. Some firearms are
"unusual" only because they are illegal, not because a "free market" has
rejected them as suitable for self-defense (or engaging in the overthrow
of an oppressive government, another value that one might see as
helping to explain the origins of the Second Amendment)."
Assuming that I am correct in ascribing Part III, and its stunning
incoherence, to the vagaries of intra-Court bargaining, how critical
should we really be? A Justice may well believe that it is vitally
important to turn what would otherwise be a plurality opinion into an
"Opinion for the Court."52 One must always remember that Supreme
Court opinions are often the products of careful negotiation; that is
certainly a lesson taught by the study of Chief Justice Warren's opinion
in Brown itself, to mention only one of the most famous examples. 3 But
consider as well a memorandum written by Chief Justice Rehnquist to
his colleagues concerning an opinion he was charged with drafting:
46. Lund, supra note 45, at 1345.
47. Heller, t28 S. Ct. at 2816.
48. Id. at 2816-17.
49. Id. at 2817.
50. Id. at 2788-99.
51. See Levinson, supra note 4, at 648; see also Sanford Levinson, Superb History, Dubious
Constitutionaland Political Theory: Comments on Uviller and Merkel, The Militia and the Right to
Arms, 12 WM. & MARY BILL Rrs. J. 315 (20o4) (book review).
52. Part of "collegiality" on a multi-member court may be a demonstrated willingness to
compromise with one's coleagues in order to generate a sufficient consensus behind a given opinion.
See Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, UnderstandingCollegialityon the Court, to U. PA. J. CON. L.
257, 259 (2o8).
53. For the canonical treatment of the extensive intra-Court deliberation (and bargaining)

process,

see RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND

BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 582-699 (3d ed. 1987); and ROBERT J. COTrROL ET AL.,
BROWN V. BOARD OFEDUCATION: CASTE, CULTURE, AND THE CONSTITUION 151-82 (2003).
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I prefer the position taken in the most recent circulation of my
proposed opinion for the Court, but want very much to avoid a
fractionated Court on that point .... If a majority prefer Nino's [Justice
Scalia's] view, I will adopt it; if I can get a majority for the view
contained in the present draft, I will adhere to that. If there is some
"middle ground" that will attract a majority, I will even adopt that. 4
It is a categorical mistake to view Supreme Court Justices, even if
they are former law professors themselves (as Scalia most certainly was),
as continuing to play the role of a professor, where intellectual coherence
is the highest value. In becoming a Justice, Scalia took on a distinctly
different role, and judicial opinions inevitably reflect the demands placed
on Justices. As is likely with such products-recall the common adage
that a camel is a horse designed by a committee-intellectual coherence
may be secondary to achieving the objective of gaining, in this instance,
the all-important fifth vote needed to turn what might otherwise have
simply been a "plurality" opinion into the "Opinion for the Court."55
Perhaps one might expect opinions signed only by a single Justice,
whether in concurrence or dissent, to meet the standards one might set
for papers in a law school seminar. That would simply be a mistake with
regard to a majority opinion of a politically aware group of Justices.
C.

ONCE SCALIA HAS MADE THE CONCESSIONS PRESENT IN PART

THEN

How

DIFFERENT

Is

III,

IT, AFTER ALL, FROM THE APPROACH TAKEN

BY CLEMENT IN HIS BRIEF?

If the opposition to that brief, by Cheney and others, was driven by a
fear that it would provide too little protection to gun owners, is there any
reason for proponents of such protection to be any more optimistic about
the consequences of Heller, even if we put to one side any possible
changes in the makeup of the federal or state judiciaries that will actually
be called upon to implement the decision? What, precisely, did the
Court- or its conservative majority -gain by rejecting the Clement brief,
and embracing Justice Scalia's opinion in its stead, beyond an onslaught
of intellectual criticism that is remarkable for bringing together
traditional adversaries who can agree, if on nothing else, that Justice
Scalia's opinion is unusually shoddy as a piece of intellectual handiwork?
Early returns suggest that "inferior courts" are proving extremely
6
hesitant to read Heller as a Magna Carta for gun owners . The only post-

54. Cross & Tiller, supra note 52, at

259 n.Io (quoting BERNARD SCHWARTZ, DECISION: HOW THE

SUPREME COURT DECIDES CASES 21 (1996)).

55. See, for example, the Court's decision just the year before in Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School DistrictNo. 1, 127 S.Ct. 2738, (2007). Justice Kennedy refused to sign Justice
Roberts's opinion and instead wrote a concurrence in the judgment, which deprived Roberts's opinion
of its imprimatur as the "Opinion of the Court." See id. at 2741; id. at 2788-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment).
56. See Liptak, supranote 22.
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Heller "winner" so far appears to be someone indicted (but not
convicted) of possessing child pornography, which carries with it the
inability to possess a gun.57 And even that decision was only by a federal
magistrate! All cases decided by district judges have ruled firmly on
behalf of the state. As Brannon Denning observed in his own
contribution to this Symposium,59 it is far too early to tell whether Heller
will be the harbinger of a significant development in legal doctrine or,
like United States v. Lopez, 6o a case generating a great deal of scholarly
sound and fury that ultimately signified almost nothing with regard to the
wider legal universe.6 ' Like Lopez, Heller has invigorated the legal
academy. The Hastings Law Journal will be joining its counterparts at
Harvard, Syracuse, UCLA, and Lewis & Clark law schools in publishing
multiple articles devoted to the case.62 It will be interesting to look back
on these symposia ten years from now-as we look back on similar
symposia on Lopez-and assess the fit between the predictions made by
both admirers and critics of the decision in Heller and the actualities of
observed behavior by courts and other relevant political actors. This may
be just one more example of the almost pathological over-estimation of
the importance of the Supreme Court by those ensconced in the legal
academy (including, for that matter, very able and conscientious
members of law reviews who learn from their professors about the
centrality of the Supreme Court).
In any event, I conclude with a simple question: Would the Courtor, for that matter, devotees of gun rights-really have been worse off
had it accepted my advice to rally around Clement and try to forge an
opinion that might have brought the two wings of the Court together and
rendered unnecessary the high-decibel debate over the ostensible
importance of originalism in discerning the present meaning of the
Second Amendment?

57. Id.; see also United States v. Arzenberger, 592 F. Supp. 2d 590 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
58. See Arzenberger, 592 F. Supp. 2d 590.
59. Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Heller High Water(mark)? Lower Courts and the
New Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1245 (2009).
6o. 514 U.S. 549 0995).
61. See, e.g., Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, Lower Court Readings of Lopez, or
What If the Supreme Court Held a ConstitutionalRevolution and Nobody Came?, 2000 Wis. L. REV.
369,369-71.
62. See Akhil Reed Amar, Comment, Heller, HLR, and Holistic Legal Reasoning, 122 HARV. L.
REV. 145 (2008); Siegel, supra note 45; Sunstein, supra note 4I; Symposium, The Second Amendment
After District of Columbia v. Heller, 13 LEwis & CLARK L. REV. 315 (2009); Symposium, The Second
Amendment and the Right to BearArms After D.C. v. Heller, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1041 (2009).
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